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Abstract 
How do we understand political polarization within the U.S. climate change debate?  This paper 
unpacks the different components of the debate to determine the source of the political divide 
that is so noted in the mainstream media and academic literatures.  Through analysis of the 
content of Congressional Hearings on the issue of climate change, we are able to explain political 
polarization of the issue more fully.  In particular, our results show that, contrary to 
representations in the mainstream media, there is increasing consensus over the science of the 
issue.  Discussions of the type of policy instrument and the economic implications of regulating 
carbon dioxide emissions, however, continue to polarize opinion. This paper concludes by 
exploring how these findings help us understand more recent political events around climate 
change.  
                                                 
 Please direct all correspondence to: 
Dana R. Fisher 
Department of Sociology 
University of Maryland 
2112 Art-Sociology 
College Park, MD 20742 
drfisher@umd.edu 
 
This research was supported by the U.S. National Science Foundation (BCS-0826892).  The authors would like to 
thank the many students who helped code these data. 
2 
 
Although President Obama took office in 2008 with campaign promises to pass a climate change 
bill through the U.S. Congress and make meaningful progress on the issue, he did not fulfill 
these promises during his first two years in office.  With the Republican take-over of the U.S. 
Congress in 2010, the political environment in Washington, DC has become increasingly 
partisan and the issue of climate change has become one of the most polarizing issues.  By 
summer 2011, in fact, former Massachusetts governor and Presidential frontrunner Mitt Romney 
was attacked by organizations and individuals from multiple components of the conservative 
base for his position on the issue (for a full discussion see Rucker and Wallsten, 2011).  When he 
stated during a town hall meeting in New Hampshire that he supported the notion that humans 
are contributing to climate change, many conservative websites reported that this position on the 
issue was untenable for a Republican candidate and tantamount to committing “political suicide” 
(see Sheppard, 2011 for a full review).  With the National Academy of Sciences maintaining a 
consistent position since 2001 that human-induced climate change is occurring and 
“temperatures are, in fact, rising” (Cicerone, 2001: 1), it is surprising to see such political 
polarization.  In particular, why is a presidential candidate’s position that echoes the 
government’s “independent advisor on scientific matters”1 so contentious? 
This article explores how we can understand the political polarization of climate politics 
in America.  Looking at the content of Congressional discussions around climate change, this 
paper unpacks the components of the debate to understand the main sources of the polarization.  
We begin our discussion by reviewing the literature on the ways that scholars have analyzed the 
polarization of the issue of climate change.   Here, we pay particular attention to the work that 
has focused on discussions within the U.S. Congress.  Next, we present an analysis of 
                                                 
1  http://www.nationalacademies.org/about/whoweare.html (Accessed 8 July 2011). 
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Congressional hearings on climate change over a four-year period, employing an innovation in 
network analysis to illustrate what aspect of the issue is drawing the most disagreement.  This 
article concludes with a discussion of how our findings help us understand recent political 
stalemates over the issue of climate change in the United States. 
 
Understanding Polarization of Climate Change Politics in the United States 
The political polarization around the issue of climate change is in stark contrast to the scientific 
consensus that has emerged over the past forty years.  As early as the 1970s, the majority of 
scholars working within atmospheric sciences agreed that the climate was changing and that it 
was, at least in part, anthropogenic (Agrawala 1998a, 1998b).   These foundational ideas were 
expanded in the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which asserted 
that the Earth is experiencing a measurable change in mean temperatures, and that this change is 
exacerbated—if not directly caused—by human activity (Houghton, Jenkins, and Ephraums, 
1991).  In 2001, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences’ Committee on the Science of Climate 
Change published a report that began with a very clear statement: “Greenhouse gases are 
accumulating in the Earth’s atmosphere as a result of human activity, causing surface air 
temperatures and subsurface ocean temperatures to rise” (Cicerone, 2001: 1; see also America’s 
Climate Choices, 2011).  In the words of the Summary for Policymakers of the IPCC’s fourth 
Assessment Report, the evidence from climate change research is “sufficient to conclude with 
high confidence that anthropogenic warming over the last three decades has had a discernible 
influence on many physical and biological systems” (Parry et al., 2007: 8; for a full review, see 
Oreskes, 2004 and Schneider, 2009). 
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At the same time, there has been a good deal of research on the politics of climate change 
in the United States (e.g.  Harris, 2000; McCright and Dunlap, 2000; 2003; Lisowski, 2002; 
Fisher, 2004; Rabe, 2004; Victor, 2004; Arimura et al., 2007; Selin and VanDeveer, 2007; 
Jacques et al., 2008).  One of the main themes in this research is explaining the American 
position in international climate change policymaking (see particularly Lisowski, 2002; Paterson, 
2009).  Other studies are more specifically interested in climate change politics inside the U.S., 
focused on understanding why there continues to be no federal policy on climate change and 
describing how this lack of policy is contributing to emerging subnational efforts (see 
particularly Jones, 1991; Lutzenhiser 2001; Christiansen, 2003; Arimura et al., 2007; Kramer 
Schreurs, 2007; Krane 2007; Rabe, 2007; see also the collection by Selin and VanDeveer, 2009).   
A small but substantial body of literature has focused specifically on the ways that the 
issue of climate change is politically polarized.  This research tends to agree with claims by 
Dunlap and McCright who state: “nowhere is the partisan gap on environmental issues more 
apparent than on climate change” (2008: 28).  Within this work, research has focused on the 
media coverage of the issue, the role that conservative think tanks have played in creating a 
counter-movement, and the ways the issue has been discussed within the U.S. Congress.  In the 
pages that follow, each of these themes will be addressed in turn.   
 
Polarization and the Media 
Extensive research has been done to understand the media coverage of climate change (e.g. 
Trumbo, 1996; Mazur, 1998; McComas and Shanahan, 1999; Shanahan and Good, 2000; 
Weingart et al. 2000).  Scholars working on this subject tend to agree that the dominant model of 
balanced news reporting used by the American media today is not well suited to presenting 
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complex and multi-dimensional scientific findings (see especially Boykoff and Boykoff, 2007; 
Boykoff and Rajan, 2007; Freudenbug and Muselli, 2010).  In his well-known book on Science 
as a Contact Sport, Stephen Schneider states: “There are rarely just two polar-opposite sides, but 
rather a spectrum of potential outcomes [in scientific research], which are often accompanied by 
a history of scientific assessment of the relative credibility of each possibility” (Schneider, 2009: 
203).   
Schneider points out that offering equal time and space to climate deniers has created a 
perception in laypeople—both those in the general public and those in positions of power—that 
the science of climate change is no more dependable or trustworthy than that of climate denial 
(2009; see also Liu et al., 2009).  Comparing the media coverage of climate change to the 
scientific findings on the issue, Freudenburg and Muselli conclude that the media tends to 
underestimate the severity of the climate problem (2010).  In their own words, “if reporters wish 
to discuss ‘both sides’ of the climate issue, the scientifically legitimate ‘other side’ is that, if 
anything, global climate disruption may prove to be significantly worse than has been suggested 
in scientific consensus to date” (2010: 483).  Thus, the literature on this subject agrees that a fair 
and balanced reporting of the U.S. climate change debate is not a fifty-fifty proposition; rather, 
there are multiple perspectives adopted by multiple actors, all of which inform both the public 
and political discussions of climate change. However, if the media were to present a truly 
balanced view of the scientific perspectives on the issues, the news coverage should be much 
more pessimistic. 
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Polarization and the Counter-movement  
At the same time, a handful of studies have specifically explored the counter-movement against 
climate change, building off of the broader social movements-focused literature on counter-
movements (e.g. Mottl, 1980; Meyer and Staggenborg, 1996). These scholars draw a link 
between the media’s portrayal of climate science as polarized, uncertain, and premature and what 
Jacques and colleagues have called an “anti-environmental counter-movement” (2008; see also 
McCright and Dunlap 2003).  Moreover, this conservative-driven effort to discredit the science 
of climate change is seen as constituting the backbone of the counter-movement against climate 
politics, which research has found to be tightly tied to American nationalism.  In their own 
words:  “The perceived threat to American values and interests posed by environmentalism 
helped justify the creation of a sustained anti-environmental counter-movement, institutionalised 
in a network of influential conservative think tanks funded by wealthy conservative foundations 
and corporations” (Jacques et al., 2008: 352).   
These conservative organizations and think tanks attack climate change not on 
ideological grounds, but on scientific ones, challenging the very existence of the issue as well as 
the ethics with which it has been studied.  On the other side are those groups that do not 
challenge the science of the issue. Instead, they argue about the imminence of a changing 
climate, the dangers of nonaction, and the benefits of possible solutions. Often, each side is 
speaking a different language and constructing their arguments around different logical frames. 
Climate change, an issue with great political ramifications, is an ideal example of how each side 
can talk “past” the other. Given this cross-talk, Hoffman (2011) concludes that one of the most 
fertile grounds for political land grabbing is in the area of climate change science. 
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Political Polarization and the U.S. Congress 
Just as climate change is an ideal example of a politically polarized debate, so too is Congress 
the best place to study it (Liu et al., 2009; Park et al., 2010; Fisher et al., 2011; see also McCright 
and Dunlap, 2003).  Park and colleagues, for example, use Congressional hearings on climate 
change to investigate the ways that various issues are framed in political debates (2010).  The 
authors find that hearings on climate change are much more likely to occur in Democrat-
controlled Congressional sessions, and that Democratic Congresses tends to feature testimony 
from more pro-environment political actors and mainstream scientists (2010: 12).  When the 
Republicans hold the majority in Congress, in contrast, testimony about the issue primarily 
comes from speakers in the business and industrial sectors.  Moreover, the content of the 
testimonies are more likely to challenge the science of climate change and discuss potential 
negative impacts of climate change policy on economic growth and foreign relations (Park et al., 
2010: 12-13; see also McCright and Dunlap, 2003).   
Although the extant literature provides accounts of many ways that the climate issue has 
been polarized in the U.S., research has yet to pull apart exactly what specific component of the 
debate is driving this political polarization.  Accordingly, this paper analyzes the content of 
Congressional debates around climate change to understand the polarization of this issue more 
fully, specifically looking at where the polarization is coming from:  the science of the issue or 
the threat of legislation. 
 
Studying Congressional Hearings  
To understand where this political polarization around climate change comes from, this paper 
analyzes data from Congressional hearings in the U.S. Congress.  Although secondary sources 
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like the news media can help to uncover some of the central topics around climate policy, data on 
Congressional testimonies provide direct accounts of the discourse and debate around climate 
legislation, as well as the issue more broadly.  We build on the earlier work by McCright and 
Dunlap, which studies Congressional hearings from 1990-1997 (2003).  In contrast to this work, 
which analyzes these data to assess the “social construction of non-problematicity” in terms of 
understanding the emergence of climate skepticism in the United States (McCright and Dunlap 
2000, 2003), we analyze data from Congressional hearings to understand what aspect of the issue 
is yielding the most dissent within the Congress.  
Congressional hearings are an important part of the policymaking process in the United 
States.  In the words of the Governmental Printing Office, Congressional hearings are the 
principal way that Congress members “obtain information and opinions on proposed legislation, 
conduct an investigation, or evaluate/oversee the activities of a government department or the 
implementation of a Federal law.”2  The importance of such hearings as a source of information 
has been noted within the academic literature as well (see particularly Arnold 1990; Burstein and 
Hirsh, 2007; Clifton, 2004; Gormley, 1998).   
Testimonies at hearings are given by a range of experts, including governmental agency 
officials, interest groups, businesses, think tanks, academic researchers, as well as members of 
the U.S. Congress (for a discussion, see DeGregorio, 1998; Burstein and Hirsh, 2007).  
Congressional hearings provide a forum for different policy actors to get their perspectives 
recognized and garner the attention and support of different political constituencies.  These 
testimonies inform decisionmakers about topics ranging from science and technology to 
economics and policy.  In the words of Burstein and Hirsh, “Members of Congress believe that 
                                                 
2 http://www.gpo.gov/help/about_congressional_hearings.htm (Accessed 11 March 2011). 
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hearings provide an efficient way to gather information and exert influence….Interest 
organizations, too, see hearings as important venues for conveying information” (2007: 179; see 
also Laumann and Knoke 1987).   
Congressional hearings, then, represent a field site wherein one can study how science, 
politics, and economic interests collide in ways that influence climate change policy, or the 
notable lack thereof.  As a result, the perspectives presented during Congressional hearings are 
an ideal data source for understanding polarization around this contentious issue.  Building from 
the literature presented here, this paper analyzes the content of Congressional hearings on 
climate change policy.  In so doing, this work will shed light, not just on who has a say in the 
climate change debate in Congress, but what they are saying, and with whom they are aligning.  
Before discussing these political and ideological alignments, however, we present the data and 
methods we use in reaching these conclusions.  
 
Data and Method 
Data for this project consist of the testimonies from climate change hearings during the 109th and 
110th sessions of the U.S. Congress.  The 109th (3 January 2005—3 January 2007) and 110th (3 
January 2007—3 January 2009) Congresses were during the second term of George W. Bush’s 
presidency.  During this time period, 341 pieces of legislation—such as bills, resolutions and 
amendments pertaining to issues about climate change or global warming—were introduced (106 
in the 109thCongress3 and 235 in the 110th Congress). 4  There was a Republican majority in both 
bodies of the U.S. Congress during the 109th session: Republicans held 55% of the voting share 
                                                 
3 http://www.pewclimate.org/federal/congress/109 (Accessed 17 March 2011). 
4 http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_congress/110thcongress.cfm (Accessed 17 March 
2011). 
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in the Senate and they held 53% of the voting share in the House of Representatives.5 In the 
110th Congress, however, Democrats controlled the majority of the House of Representatives 
with 54.3% of the voting share.  During this Congressional session, Democrats held 49 seats in 
the Senate.  However, the two Independent members of the Senate both caucused with the 
Democrats, which resulted in their holding 51% of the voting share during this session.6  As will 
be demonstrated by our data below, each Independent Senator aligned with the Democratic 
stance in both sessions of Congress. 
Using the Government Printing Office (GPO) as a data collection resource, we conducted 
a search for all hearings that discussed climate change.  The GPO archives transcripts from 
Congressional hearings and makes them available for the public record.7 Using the search terms 
“global warming” and “climate change,” we identified all of the hearings that discussed these 
issues during the 109th and 110th Sessions of the U.S. Congress (2005-2008).  Although our 
primary resource for obtaining transcripts of testimonies is the GPO, the results of these searches 
were cross-referenced with two other sources to ensure accuracy: THOMAS,8 the website and 
search engine for the Library of Congress; and the Pew Center on Global Climate Change, a non-
profit that monitors climate change discussions and legislation in the U.S. Congress.9 The results 
of the searches from these three sources were compared to ensure that all of the hearings about 
climate change were accounted for and included in the dataset.   
In addition to comparing these findings, the contents of each hearing were reviewed to 
confirm that the focus of each hearing was, in fact, the topic of climate change.  After this 
                                                 
5 During the 109th Session of the U.S. Congress, there was one independent member of the Senate and one 
independent member of the House of Representatives.   
6 For more detail, see www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/RS22555.pdf (Accessed 14 March 2011). 
7 For details, see http://www.gpoaccess.gov/crecord/ (Accessed 14 March 2011). 
8 For details, see http://thomas.loc.gov/ (Accessed 14 March 2011). 
9 For details, see http://www.pewclimate.org/federal/archives (Accessed 14 March 2011). 
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review, eight hearings in the 109th and three hearings in the 110th Session of Congress were 
excluded from the analyses.10  In the end, our searches yielded 71 relevant hearings between 
2005 and 2008.  Consistent with the work of Park and his colleagues (2010), there were more 
hearings on climate change in 110th Session of Congress, where the Democrats held the majority. 
We analyzed transcripts from 29 hearings in the 109th Congress, which included a total of 498 
testimonies and statements submitted by groups not in attendance.11  From the 110th Congress, 
there were 42 relevant hearings and 598 total testimonies by members of the Congress.  Only 
formal testimonies and statements were included in the analysis.  Comments made during the 
question-and-answer portion of the hearings were not analyzed. 
 The testimonies from these Congressional hearings comprised the dataset, which was 
then analyzed using the Discourse Network Analyzer (DNA) program.  DNA is a new computer 
program that allows for the qualitative coding of articles and statements and prepares the data for 
network analysis and visualizations so that the relationship between the actors in each 
“discourse” can be mapped and the strength of these ties can be quantified.  The testimonies 
were organized according to hearing number and speaker.  These speakers and organizations 
were then classified into nine types: Congressional Democrats; Congressional Republicans; 
politically independent Congresspeople; administrative and executive offices; environmental 
interest groups; businesses; business interest groups and trade associations; scientists and science 
centers; and “other,” a category that includes actors who do not fall into the other categories, 
such as religious organizations or state-level elected officials.   
                                                 
10  For example, Senate Hearing 109-448, the “U.S. foreign policy, petroleum, and the Middle East: Hearing 
before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United 
States Senate,” came up in our search.  Upon review of the content of the hearing, however, it was determined that 
climate change was an element of the discussion, but was not the main focus of the hearing.  As a result, this hearing 
was one of those removed from our analysis. 
11  For the remainder of this paper, we refer to these as “testimonies.” 
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 The testimonies themselves were coded for eight categories that are particularly relevant 
to discussions about climate change policy in the United States.  Coding involved noting whether 
the speaker agreed or disagreed with the specific statement.  Two of the categories were about 
the science of climate change, which has been a central theme in the climate change debate in the 
United States: “climate change is real and anthropogenic” and “climate change is caused by 
greenhouse gases (GHGs).” The six other categories were about different climate policy issues: 
“there should be legislation to regulate the emission of pollutants,” “legislation should regulate 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions,” “legislation that regulates carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions will 
not hurt the economy,” “the United States should regulate carbon dioxide (CO2) regardless of 
what developing countries do,” “legislation should establish a market for carbon emissions (cap 
and trade),” and “there should be a carbon tax.” Whenever a statement falling under one of the 
eight categories was made, the statement was coded appropriately.  Sometimes specific 
testimonies included multiple statements that were coded in the same category.  In some cases, 
statements included mention of both sides of the issue. 
This article focuses on the results of four of the codes from this analysis.  We compare 
the science statements (“climate change is real and anthropogenic” and “climate change is 
caused by GHGs”) to two statements focused on policy and the economy (“legislation should 
regulate CO2 emissions,” and “legislation that regulates CO2 emissions will not hurt the 
economy”). 
 
Network Analysis Technique 
Each relevant statement of a political actor was coded for four variables: the name of the actor, 
the classification of the policy actor into one of nine types, the issue addressed by the actor, and a 
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dummy variable indicating either a positive or a negative stance on the issue. For each issue, the 
statements were transformed into an actor-by-stance affiliation matrix with two columns (one for 
agreement with the issue and one for disagreement) and with actors occupying the rows of the 
matrix. The cells of the matrix contain binary information on whether an actor referred to the 
issue in a certain way.12 
Each rectangular actor-by-stance affiliation matrix was then converted into a square 
actor-by-actor co-occurrence matrix where the cell entries reflect the number of shared issue 
stances between the row actor and the column actor, with diagonal entries (“loops” in the 
language of social network analysis) left blank. Cell entries of value 0 indicate that there was no 
shared stance between two actors, cell entries of value 1 indicate that there was one shared stance 
(either both agreeing to the issue or both disagreeing), and cell entries of value 2 reflect cases 
where both actors sent mixed signals. Such a co-occurrence matrix can be interpreted as an 
undirected and weighted network. The network can be visualized as a graph with actors as 
vertices and the number of shared issue stances as edge weights between these vertices. 
It is possible to aggregate such a “discourse network” over many issues (see Leifeld and 
Haunss, forthcoming, for an example). In our application to Congressional testimony, however, 
our aim is to compare univariate networks—co-occurrence networks based on a single issue—in 
terms of their polarization and actor composition.  In the network diagrams, the size of each node 
is proportional to the overall number of statements regarding the current issue that the actor 
makes during the 109th and 110th Congress. This measure is taken as an indicator of how 
important the issue is to the actor. The color of the node reflects the actor type. 
                                                 
12 Data collection and manipulation were completed using the software Discourse Network Analyzer (Leifeld, 
2010; cf. Leifeld and Haunss, forthcoming). 
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Any univariate, issue-specific network diagram is composed of two completely 
connected subgraphs (“components”) – one representing agreement to the issue and the other one 
disagreement. In some cases, there are actors who send mixed signals and refer to the issue both 
in a positive and in a negative way. These actors thus connect the two components. We interpret 
these apparent self-contradictions as moderate positions on the issue because these actors try to 
align strategically with both camps instead of committing themselves to one position. This 
interpretation alleviates the potential oversimplification of employing binary agreement patterns, 
which was imposed in the first place because the reliability and validity of making more fine-
grained judgments about agreement or disagreement would be too low. Conveniently, these 
moderate actors occupy the center of the network. The discourse network diagrams are thus a 
good way to operationalize and visualize the polarization of the actor space over one or more 
issues. 
 
Findings 
In the pages that follow, we present the results of our analyses of climate change hearings in the 
109th and 110th Sessions of the US Congress.  We start by looking at the frequencies of these 
statements and the descriptive statistics of participants in these hearings.  Next, we present 
network diagrams for each of the four statements.  By analyzing the patterns within these 
diagrams, we highlight the ideological and political polarization present in each session of 
Congress. 
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Frequencies of Statements 
We begin our analysis by looking at the overall frequency of these statements.  Figure 1 shows 
the overall statement frequencies in each Congress for the four statements.  According to the 
figure on the left, negative statements about whether climate change is anthropogenic and about 
the role of greenhouse gases were in the minority of statements in the 109th Congress (22 and 12 
statements, respectively), and decreased somewhat by the 110th Congress (to 19 and 4 statements, 
respectively).  Positive responses for each statement, on the other hand, essentially doubled from 
the 109th Congress to the 110th (from 52 to 106 statements for the greenhouse gas question, and 
from 76 to 150 statements in the anthropogenesis question).  Given these results, we can 
conclude that the transition from the 109th to the 110th Congress saw increased consensus on 
these issues; while a vocal minority testified that climate change was not anthropogenic and not 
linked to greenhouse gases, the vast majority of speakers agreed that greenhouse gases and 
human activity were causing climate change.  
In the analysis of the two political codes—“legislation should regulate carbon dioxide 
(CO2) emissions” and “legislation that regulates carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions will not hurt the 
economy”—there is much greater polarization, as illustrated on the right side of Figure 1. 
Statements asserting that the legislation of carbon dioxide emissions would hurt the economy 
decreased from 52 to 36 between the 109th and 110th Congresses. Speakers who stated that the 
government should not regulate emissions also decreased between the 109th and 110th sessions of 
the Congress, from 22 to 11 statements. At the same time, statements supporting legislation and 
those that asserted its harmlessness to the economy increased between these two sessions of 
Congress. Twenty-nine speakers stated that regulation would not hurt the economy in the 109th 
Congress; this number almost doubled to 50 in the 110th Congress.  Furthermore, 45 speakers 
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asserted that the federal government should regulate emissions through legislation in the 109th 
Congress; this number increased to 58 in the 110th Congress.  The figures illustrate that, for these 
statements, the transition from the 109th to the 110th session of Congress was much less 
consensual than they were for the science statements; speaker opinions may have shifted as 
political control of Congress shifted, but the majority/minority divide illustrated in the science 
questions is not present here. With only two sessions of Congress in our dataset, it is difficult to 
isolate the effect of party politics on agenda-setting. The evidence does highlight, however, that 
an array of different actors and interests were involved in the discussion of climate change 
policy. Moreover, consistent with the work of Park and his colleagues (2010), our findings 
suggest that the party in power plays a role in the way the issue is discussed within 
Congressional hearings.  
 
 
Figure 1: Statement Frequency Over Time, Science Questions and Questions about 
Legislation 
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Participation in Congressional Hearings on Climate Change 
Next, building off of the work by Burstein and Hirsh (2007), Gormley (1998) and McCright and 
Dunlap (2003), we analyze the types of actors who made statements during the climate change 
hearings in our sample. Table 1 presents these results. Contrary to what one might expect, given 
the scientific aspect of hearings about climate change, scientists presented only a small portion of 
the statements in these hearings (about 8% in the 109th and 11% in the 110th Congress).  These 
findings are significantly lower than in McCright and Dunlap’s analysis of Congressional 
hearings from 1990-1997, which found that 27.9% of testimonies were given by scientists (2003: 
362).  These differences are likely to be the result of the ways that the issue of climate change 
has evolved in the United States since the early 1990s.   
Even with these differences, our findings are consistent with the study by McCright and 
Dunlap (2003: 362), as well as Burstein and Hirsh’s paper on policy innovation in the US 
Congress (2007: 186; see also DeGregorio, 1998).  Specifically, the majority of the speakers in 
both sessions of the Congress came from different branches of the US government (Burstein and 
Hirsh, 2007).  Although the hearings in both sessions of the Congress were dominated by 
government actors, there are a number of differences between these two sessions that are worth 
noting.  First, there are striking differences between the government actors participating in the 
climate change hearings in these different sessions of the Congress.  Even though the rules of the 
US Congress stipulate that the minority party is given the opportunity to call witnesses at 
Congressional hearings,13 participation in these hearings was very different in the two sessions of 
Congress.  In the 109th Congress, which had a Republican majority, 24% of the statements were 
                                                 
13 For a full discussion of these rules see http://lieberman.senate.gov/assets/pdf/crs/senatehearings.pdf for the 
Sentate and http://www.house.gov/house/Tying_it_all.shtml for the House of Representatives.  (Accessed 17 March 
2011). 
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provided by Republican members of the Congress.  During the 110th session of the Congress, 
which had a Democratic majority, in contrast, only 5% of the people making statements were 
Republican.  Although the level of Republican participation changed significantly during these 
two Congressional sessions, Democratic participation remained relatively stable (24% and 20% 
respectively).  At the same time, participation by the Bush Administration increased significantly 
between the 109th and 110th sessions (10% and 22% respectively).  This finding is consistent 
with the work of DeGregorio who finds executive participation in Congress to be very high 
“when presidential autonomy is at stake” (1998: 146).     
There are also noteworthy differences among participation by non-governmental actors.  
Participation by representatives of businesses and business /trade associations decreased between 
the 109th and 110th sessions of Congress (in aggregate, 20% to 14%).  However, environmental 
group participation went up between these two sessions of Congress (from 9% to almost 15%).  
It is interesting to note that the level of participation by business and environmental actors is 
relatively consistent with the findings from earlier research on climate change hearings, where 
20.9% of all testimonies were given by business actors and 8.4% of all testimonies were given by 
environmental actors (McCright and Dunlap 2003: 362-363).  Moreover, these findings are 
consistent with those of Park and his colleagues in their study of connections among 
Congressional committees, Congressional hearings, and the witnesses at these hearings, which 
finds that there are significant differences in witness selection based on the party that held the 
majority (2010). 
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Mapping Ideological Networks 
Although these descriptive statistics show some interesting patterns of participation during the 
two sessions of the US Congress, they do not tell us anything about the content of the hearings.  
Accordingly, we now look at how the different policy actors’ testimonies were related.  In 
particular, this analysis presents the network diagrams for each of the statements separately.  
These diagrams represent organizational positions for and against each category.  In each 
diagram, the left hand side of the figure represents those actors who are against each category.  
Those who agree with the categories are placed on the right hand side of the diagram.  
Organizational affiliation is depicted by the color of the node: blue nodes indicate 
Democrats in Congress, red indicates Republicans in Congress, aqua indicates Independents in 
Congress, pink indicates representatives from the executive branch of the government, green 
indicates environmental groups, purple indicates businesses, orange indicates business and trade 
Table 1. Organizational Affiliations of Witnesses at Congressional Hearings on Climate 
Change (2005-2008). 
  
109th Congress (2005-
2006) 
110th Congress (2007-
2008) 
Business 48 (11.7%) 36 (9.2%) 
Business Association/Trade Group 37 (9.0%) 19 (4.9%) 
Democrat 100 (24.3%) 79 (20.2%) 
Environmental Group 36 (8.7%) 58 (14.8%) 
Government Agency 41 (10%) 87 (22.3%) 
Independent 5 (1.2%) 0 
Republican 99 (24%) 19 (4.9%) 
Scientist 34 (8.3%) 42 (10.7%) 
Other 12 (2.9%) 51 (13.0%) 
Total Groups  412 391 
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associations, yellow indicates scientists, and grey indicates policy actors that fall into the “other” 
category. Node size is dependent on the number of times the actors talked about the same 
category.  For clarity, nodes are only labeled in these maps if the actor made two or more 
statements.14  The connections between the nodes are either red, to indicate disagreement with 
the statement, or blue, to indicate agreement with the statement.  Those actors listed in the 
middle of the diagrams spoke on both sides of the issue; we interpret these speakers as presenting 
moderate positions on the issue because they try to align strategically with both camps instead of 
committing to one position.  In the sections below, each map will be discussed in turn.   
Climate change is real and anthropogenic.  During the 109th Congress, 54 people made 
statements about this issue.  About 23% of all of the statements were in disagreement with the 
claim that climate change is real and anthropogenic.  Two actors took a moderate position, 
speaking on both sides of the issue.  In this session of Congress, those who spoke in 
disagreement included political actors from business, science, and governmental representatives 
from the administration and four Republicans in Congress.   It is worth noting that the science 
centers that provided testimony against this statement included Colorado State University, the 
University of Virginia, and James Cook University, all of which were known at the time to house 
noted climate change skeptics.  In support of the statement were scientists, environmental 
groups, businesses and business associations, as well as representatives from administrative 
offices and Republicans, Democrats, and Independents from the U.S. Congress. Moderate actors 
included the head of the National Academy of Sciences, Ralph Cicerone and a scientist at the 
University of Oklahoma. 
                                                 
14  The exception to this rule will be found in Figure 3: Network Diagrams for the Statement: “Climate Change 
is Caused by Greenhouse Gases (GHGs),” where, due to its unique position in the 110th Congressional map, Murray 
Energy Corporation is labeled despite making only one statement. 
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Figure 2: Network Diagrams for the Statement: “Climate Change is Real and 
Anthropogenic.” 
 
109th Congress 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
110th Congress 
 
Notes: Blue nodes indicate Democrats in Congress, Red indicates Republicans in Congress, 
Aqua indicates Independents in Congress, Pink indicates representatives from the executive 
branch of the government, Green indicates environmental groups, Purple indicates businesses, 
Orange indicates business and trade organizations, Yellow indicates scientists, and Grey 
indicates policy actors that fall into the “other” category. Node size is dependent on the number 
of times the actors talked about the same category. Red lines indicate opposition to the statement. 
Blue lines indicate agreement.  
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By the 110th Congress, the number of times this issue came up increased to 97.  Of those 
statements, about 11% were in disagreement with this issue.  Those who disagreed include 
Congressional Republicans, a House Democrat, businesses, and representatives from two 
environmental groups known to promote climate skepticism.  Supporters of this issue included 
scientists, environmental groups, businesses and a business association, representatives from 
administrative offices, and Republicans, Democrats, and Independents. As with the 109th, this 
session of Congress also had two speakers discuss both sides of the issue: two House 
Republicans.  
The map for the 109th Congress shows that there was a substantial contrary minority, 
representing almost a quarter of all speakers.  Two years later, in the 110th Congress, there was 
significantly less disagreement about this issue.  We also note in the transition to the 110th 
Congress that the types of actor who spoke out against climate change shifted; Republicans led 
the charge in both Congresses.  In the 109th Congress, their allies were typically climate change 
skeptics within the scientific community. However, the 110th Congress saw the Republicans 
joining forces with business and environmental groups that supported skepticism. 
Climate change is caused by greenhouse gases.  While some level of consensus around 
the notion that climate change is real and anthropogenic can be seen during the hearings of these 
two sessions of Congress, analysis of the content of testimonies that discuss whether greenhouse 
gases cause climate change had even stronger results. 
In the 109th Congress, 39 speakers spoke about this issue, with almost 19% of their 
statements disagreeing with the notion that climate change is caused by greenhouse gases.  Like 
the previous subject in the 109th Congress, there were four scientific centers that also spoke in 
opposition. It should again be noted that these scientific centers housed prominent climate 
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change skeptics, who were themselves in the minority in their disciplines.  The other dissenting 
speakers include Senate Republicans and a business interest group.  In support of this statement 
were environmental groups, scientists, businesses and business associations, along with 
administrative offices and Democrats in the House and Senate and one House Republican.  There 
were no moderate speakers on this subject in this session of Congress. 
Consensus is nowhere more plainly illustrated in our analysis than on this statement in 
the 110th Congress.  During this session of Congress, 72 actors spoke about this issue and only 
two of them stated that climate change was not caused by greenhouse gases (about 4% of all 
statements).  The two dissenters were the CEO of Murray Energy Corporation and one 
Republican member of the House of Representatives.  Those who spoke in agreement included 
numerous administrative offices, scientists, environmental groups, businesses and business 
associations, and Republicans and Democrats from both the House and Senate.   
It is clear from Figure 3 that the question of whether or not greenhouse gases are causing 
climate change became substantially more consensual in the years between the 109th and 110th 
Congresses. Whereas the same small but significant cadre of skeptical scientists and Republican 
Congresspeople spoke against this statement in the 109th Congress, nearly everyone—from 
scientists to businesses, from the administration to the lobby floor, and on both sides of the 
aisle—agreed in the 110th Congress that greenhouse gases were causing climate change.  In sum, 
by 2007, the science of climate change was not a politically polarizing issue in the U.S. 
Congress.  
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Figure 3: Network Diagrams for the Statement: “Climate Change is Caused by Greenhouse 
Gases (GHGs).” 
 
109th Congress 
 
110th Congress 
 
Notes: Same as above  
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Figure 4: Network Diagrams for the Statement: “Legislation Should Regulate CO2 
Emissions.” 
 
109th Congress 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
110th Congress 
 
 
Notes: Same as above 
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Figure 5: Network Diagrams for the Statement: “Legislation that Regulates CO2 Emissions 
Will Not Hurt the Economy.” 
 
109th Congress  
 
 
110th Congress 
 
 
Notes: Same as above 
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Legislation should regulate CO2 emissions.  In contrast to the consensus we see regarding the 
science of climate change, we turn now to issues related to what policy instrument is appropriate 
for regulating carbon dioxide, and what consequences could be expected from these instruments.  
First, we consider the question of whether legislation should regulate carbon dioxide emissions.  
In the 109th Congress, there were 37 actors who spoke about carbon dioxide regulation.  Of all 
the statements made on the issue, about 41% were against regulation.  Those who opposed 
included Senate Republicans, business and business associations, and one administrative office.  
Speaking in support of legislating carbon dioxide were representatives of environmental groups, 
businesses and business associations, scientists, administrative offices and Senate Democrats and 
Independents.   All of the environmental interests that spoke on this issue in this Congress spoke 
in support of regulating emissions.  Only one political actor—a business—spoke moderately on 
this issue.  Although the majority still spoke in agreement with this statement, there was much 
less consensus here compared to the science questions described in the previous two sections.  
Political polarization is also present in the 110th Congress, but at a reduced level.  Here, 
48 speakers mentioned the issue.  Of those, about 16% spoke against the regulation of carbon 
dioxide emissions.   Speakers against the issue included Republicans, an environmental 
organization that promotes climate skepticism, an administrative office, and a business.  Those 
who supported legislation included environmental groups, scientists, businesses and business 
associations, administrative offices, as well as Democrats and Republicans from both houses of 
the Congress.  In the 110th Congress, there were no moderate voices speaking on this issue. 
Though the polarization in the 110th is less than that in the 109th Congress, these network 
diagrams do illustrate an important point: polarization in these Congressional hearings is not 
limited to polarization along party lines. During this time period, climate change also polarized 
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science against industry, industry against industry, and environmental interests against business 
interests. 
 Legislation that regulates CO2 emissions will not hurt the economy.  Consistent with the 
political polarization around the question of whether or not legislation should regulate carbon 
dioxide emissions, there were many speakers offering diverse opinions on the economic impact 
of such a regulation.  In fact, this issue was the most polarized within these sessions of 
Congress—with the two sides almost in parity during the 109th Congress.  Forty-five speakers 
spoke about this issue and 64% of the statements claimed that regulating emissions would be 
harmful to the economy.  Speakers in disagreement with this issue included businesses and 
business associations, one scientist, Republicans from the House and Senate, and administrative 
offices.  There was also one Senate Democrat—Senator Barack Obama—who spoke about how 
regulating carbon dioxide emissions would harm the coal industry in Illinois.   All Republicans 
and actors representing business and trade associations spoke on this side of this issue.  In 
contrast, speakers who stated that regulating carbon dioxide would not harm the economy 
included environmental groups, businesses and business associations, one scientist, and 
Democrats from the House and Senate. All of the representatives from environmental groups 
spoke on this side of the issue. 
 This issue became somewhat less polarized in the 110th Congress.  Here, 48 speakers 
spoke about this issue and about 42% of the statements were in opposition.  Those who spoke 
about the negative economic effects included businesses and Republicans.  Those who supported 
the issue included Democrats and Republicans from both houses of the Congress, environmental 
groups, scientists, and an administrative office.  Here again, all of the environmental groups that 
spoke on this issue, spoke on this side of the issue.  Speaking moderately were one 
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administrative office, one business, and one organization categorized as “other.”  Although this 
issue was slightly less polarized in the 110th Congress, no clear consensus emerged.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Overall, the results of our analysis of the content of the discussions in Congressional hearings 
about climate change in the 109th and 110th sessions of the U.S. Congress provide interesting 
detail about political polarization and climate politics.  In the U.S., this polarization is focused 
around, not the science of the issue, but perspectives on the policy instrument and the economic 
implications of the implementation of such an instrument. These results contribute to a more 
nuanced understanding about how the science of the issue is being used by political actors 
against the regulation of carbon dioxide to stymie progress in the Congress.  On the science 
questions, skeptical scientists make up about half of the speakers who deny the existence of 
climate change or the accountability of humanity for causing it. In both science questions, 
climate skepticism was much less prevalent in the Democratic 110th Congress. 
Although there was an overall trend towards consensus across these four issues from the 
109th to the 110th sessions of Congress, there was still a good deal of polarization around the 
political aspects of the issue.  Moreover, disagreement about the economic implications of the 
regulation of carbon dioxide only fell from 64% to 42% over this time period. In more recent 
years, this polarization can be seen by the failure of the 111th Congress to pass climate legislation 
through both Houses of Congress. According to the research presented here, no comprehensive 
climate change policy could be enacted on the national level in the United States as long as 
scientific debates are allowed to continue to mask the true source of disagreement on climate 
change policy: the uncertain economic and political implications of climate change legislation. 
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In sum, by unpacking the content of discussions within Congressional hearings on 
climate change, we learn a lot more about the source of political polarization.  While the 
literature has demonstrated that the American public is increasingly aware of climate change as a 
real phenomenon, is increasingly likely to attribute it to human activity, and fears for the future 
of the country as a result of calamitous change, that growing consensus does not translate up 
from the constituency to the political actors who can affect policy (Dunlap and McCright, 2008; 
see also McCright and Dunlap 2011).  In other words, the results presented here, which focus on 
the perspectives of political elites, do not reflect the situation in the larger public; rather, the 
story told in this paper is one of polarization among the very people who have the greatest 
impact on the problem, and the greatest capacity to make change.  
Future research must continue this type of analysis to look more deeply into where 
political polarization is coming from and what issues are the focus of disagreement.  In 
particular, this research would benefit from a longer time series, including more sessions of 
Congress in order to expand on our knowledge of the agreement and polarization that occurs 
between political actors around issues of climate change, when there are different combinations 
of political party leadership in the Congress and the Administration.  Finally, research in this 
vein must continue to look beyond the numbers of speakers giving testimony to the content of 
what these political actors are saying. Doing so may help to isolate and elaborate on the effect of 
party politics as well as the influence wielded by scientific experts, the private sector, and 
environmental interests.
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